Staff writer Muhammad Kamal dissects the difficult situation the new leadership of Syria and regional actors finds themselves in.
Following the toppling of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime, the political landscape of Syria has transformed dramatically. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), now leading the new government, must strike an intricate balancing act between competing regional powers and domestic forces. While attempting to rebuild a nation fractured by years of civil war. Their success or failure could reshape the Middle East’s balance of power.
Power Brokers: Regional Forces Shaping Syria’s Future
Türkiye has emerged as the dominant external player, vindicating President Erdoğan’s Syrian strategy. This has involved extensive support to the Syrian opposition, partly due to their shared Muslim Brotherhood leanings, as well as hosting around 3.6 million Syrian refugees. The Turkish intelligence chief’s unprecedented visit to Damascus – the first by a senior foreign official since Assad’s fall – marked a significant shift in regional dynamics. Turkish-backed forces, including the Syrian National Army (SNA), have capitalized on HTS’s seizure of Damascus to make rapid gains against the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the north.
The Kurdish question represents perhaps the most complex challenge. The SDF, a Kurdish group backed by the US to keep a check on ISIS, controls approximately 70 percent of Syria’s oil and gas fields, making them an essential partner in any future settlement. However, appeasing Kurdish interests risks antagonizing Türkiye, which views Kurdish autonomy as a security threat due to alleged Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) involvement. The new government must find a way to offer Kurds a seat at the table while ensuring the removal of PKK elements – a prerequisite for Turkish cooperation.
Iran’s regional influence has suffered significant setbacks, with the weakening of key partners including Hezbollah, a member of the so called ‘axis of resistance’, and Assad’s fall. The election of a United States, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan-aligned army general to the Lebanese presidency has further diminished Tehran’s regional sway. Russia’s influence has waned as well, with Syria pressing for reparations, setting the tone for further dialogue between the two nations.
In the south, the Southern Operations Chamber, led by the United Arab Emirates and Jordan-backed Ahmad Al Awda, has refused integration into the newly formed Syrian army, adding another layer of complexity to the government’s challenges. The Syrian government has also rejected the SDF’s demand to maintain an autonomous military bloc within the Syrian army as a condition for integration.
Building Legitimacy: The New Government’s First Steps
The new administration has launched several initiatives to demonstrate its commitment to inclusive governance in Syria. These include appointing Maysaa Sabrine as the first female governor of the central bank and installing a female Druze governor in the Druze-majority Suweida province. They’ve also reached out to Christian minorities in Aleppo with Church Leaders meeting with government officials to ensure that religious freedom will be guaranteed. Their approach to the Alawite community, Assad’s main support base, has combined rhetoric centred on justice and retribution with clear directives to protect innocents.
On the international front, the government has shown diplomatic pragmatism. Meetings with the International Criminal Court’s chief prosecutor regarding Assad-era war crimes demonstrate willingness to engage with international institutions. This has yielded some benefits, with the United States easing aid restrictions and the EU considering lifting some sanctions. The administration has also undertaken diplomatic initiatives in the region, visiting Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan and Qatar.
The government’s handling of foreign fighters reflects its complex domestic balancing act. While pursuing widespread efforts to purge the Syrian military of foreign elements, HTS has appointed select Turkish, Jordanian, and Uyghur fighters to its military as recognition of jihadist efforts. This careful calibration aims to maintain support among HTS’s base, which includes former Al Qaeda and ISIS operatives, while projecting a more moderate image internationally. While such acknowledgment of foreign fighters may be a temporary necessity during early normalization, this approach should be reversed once Syria’s situation stabilises and the need to appease Islamist factions shrinks.
Charting a Path Forward: Key Priorities for Stability
Looking ahead, several strategic moves could help secure Syria’s stability. A truth and reconciliation commission akin to the post-apartheid South African body could facilitate societal healing while demonstrating commitment to justice internally. The government should replicate its provision of basic economic and municipal services, as demonstrated in Idlib, while transitioning away from a state-controlled oligarchy. This economic restructuring is crucial not just for efficiency, but for fostering inclusive wealth creation across Syria’s diverse communities. By dismantling monopolistic structures, the government could enable minorities to build economic stakes in the new Syria. Such economic inclusivity would serve as a powerful counterweight to sectarian tensions, creating shared interests in stability and prosperity across ethnic and religious divides.
Minority rights require particular attention. The Druze have shed their long-standing desire for exemption from military conscription. Instead, they are determined to help rebuild, demanding improved public services and a secular state. Implementing a system similar to the Ottoman millet model could grant religious minorities judicial autonomy while satisfying Islamist factions within the nation. While this might temporarily hinder the formation of a unified Syrian identity, it could prove crucial for maintaining stability.
The return of Donald Trump to the US presidency could reshape regional dynamics. Trump’s personal rapport with Erdoğan might facilitate a grand bargain: replacing the Russian military base in Tartus, whose lease has reportedly been cancelled, with a Turkish one, allowing Turkey to act as a regional security guarantor while addressing American concerns about ISIS resurgence.
One possible model for Syria’s reconstruction involves the Turkish-Qatari axis, leveraging Türkiye’s robust construction sector and existing presence in northern Syria, alongside Qatar’s substantial financial resources. Reconstruction is a prerequisite to the return of refugees from Türkiye and elsewhere, many of whom are hesitant to return to ruined homes. This movement would be a significant domestic political victory for Erdoğan incentivising Türkiye’s involvement in rebuilding Syrian infrastructure.
The new government must also address regional security concerns. Guarantees from Iraq are essential to prevent militias from using its territory to launch attacks into Syria, as has occurred previously. The administration should also continue its crack down on production of the drug captagon, a major concern for Gulf states, to build goodwill with wealthy Arab neighbours.
Simultaneously, the HTS administration must demonstrate an unwavering focus on local Syrian issues. This includes reining in hard-line elements within its own ranks to prevent outbreaks of violence that could derail diplomatic progress. Recent incidents of armed militias masquerading as government forces and instigating sectarian violence underscore the urgent need for stronger security measures and accountability. To address these challenges, the administration must prioritize transparency in its operations and accelerate the adoption of a new constitution. These steps are crucial not only for establishing the rule of law but also for building trust among Syria’s diverse communities and preventing the exploitation of sectarian divisions by both internal and external actors.
Syria’s future hinges not only on domestic reconstruction but also on navigating a complex web of regional power dynamics. The new government’s success will depend on its ability to balance the interests of various internal factions while maintaining international credibility. If it can manage these competing forces and uphold domestic legitimacy, it has the potential to establish a stable and prosperous future for Syria.
