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The NATO Myth: What Really Drove Putin into Ukraine?

Estonian Foreign Ministry, CC BY 2.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0>, via Wikimedia Commons

Staff Writer Vishwa Shah analyses the motivations behind Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

When Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine in 2022, many in the West attributed it to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) expansion infringing on Russia’s sphere of influence. However, is that really the reason, a simple answer to a complicated question?

The events leading up to the invasion reveal a mix of fear on the Russian side, the Western dream of a Europe free from war and the end of ‘Fortress Europe’ as a concept, to name a few, all fed into fatal misunderstandings about Europe’s future.

The result: Europe’s deadliest war in decades.

This article explores the reasons behind the Russian invasion to understand how the same mistakes could be avoided in the future.

Part One: NATO moves East

One of the reasons why Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 was the eastward expansion of NATO.

The foundations of NATO expansion were established during German Reunification. On 10 February 1990, West German Chancellor Kohl secured unification without Soviet conditions. This confirmed that Germany could remain in NATO after reunification.

Later, on 12 September 1990, the Two-Plus-Four Treaty, which formally addressed the external aspects of German reunification, was signed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the United States of America (US) and Western allies. While the treaty required the former East Germany to remain demilitarised, at the last minute, the West German Foreign Minister Genscher, alongside US Secretary of State Baker, added a written addendum to the Treaty known as the ‘Agreed Minute.’ This allowed NATO forces to be deployed to the former East Germany at the discretion of the German government, dominated by former West German officials following East Germany’s collapse. The Two-Plus-Four Treaty and the Agreed Minute were signed by both parties, which helped create the conditions for future NATO expansion should the USSR become hostile again.

When Clinton came to power in 1993, the USSR was dissolved, and a new Russia was born under President Yeltsin. By April 1993, the Clinton administration remained committed to eastward NATO expansion after hearing from presidents and prime ministers of former Warsaw Pact and Soviet republics who were afraid of Russia. As such, these countries began setting the conditions necessary for their countries to join NATO.

The push of Central and Eastern European countries to join NATO and the delicate balance between the USA and Russia relations led to the establishment of a Partnership for Peace (PfP) at the January 1994 NATO summit. The organisation was established as a way for NATO to offer aid militarily without the countries themselves joining NATO. This was done to ensure phased NATO expansion eastwards without inflaming tensions with Russia.

Despite this, many Eastern and Central European countries, alongside US officials, opposed PfP. They wanted an immediate eastward expansion of NATO, starting with Poland. This pushed Clinton to pursue rapid enlargement rather than a phased approach.

During the Brussels NATO ministerial meeting on 1 December 1994, without informing Russia, the alliance’s foreign ministers opened the door for NATO expansion, which began to sour relations between the US and Russia.

What began as a cautious expansion of NATO in the early 1990s eventually became, in Moscow’s eyes, a direct strategic threat. By the time Ukraine moved closer to Western military and political institutions, Putin saw invasion as the only way to stop what he viewed as NATO’s expansion towards the borders of Russia.

Part Two: Pipelines and Power

Another reason why Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 was due to Gas pipelines and Energy politics. Ukraine is a vital transit route for Russian gas to an energy-hungry European Union (EU). On 30 December 2019, Russia’s Gazprom and Ukraine’s Naftogaz signed a five-year gas transit deal, brokered by the EU. On 1 January 2020, the gas transit deal took effect, which ensured Russian gas continued to flow via Ukraine. This made Ukraine strategically important.

Control of gas routes also gave Moscow a powerful motive for invasion. There are 3 main gas pipelines: the Yamal-Europe pipeline, Nord Stream 1 and 2. Nord Stream 1 and 2 were especially important as these pipelines directly connected Russia and Germany, bypassing Ukraine. This reduced Kyiv’s leverage and deepened Europe’s dependence on Russia. It became especially significant after the ousting of the former President of Ukraine, Yanukovych, in 2014. For Moscow, controlling or neutralising Ukraine’s role in energy transit became a strategic necessity.

Even now, with the Russia-Ukraine war ongoing, sanctions have proven limited in impact since the West and other third parties still purchase Russian oil and gas.

Part Three: The Fear of Westernisation

A further reason why Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 was to prevent Westernisation, as seen in the colour revolutions and Euromaidan 2014. These were promoted and financed by the West. On 22 November 2004, for example, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine occurred due to Yanukovych being elected while exit polls favoured Yushchenko. This led to a re-election, which Yushchenko won.

These revolutions, alongside Euromaidan 2014, which saw President Yanukovych ousted from Ukraine as he refused Ukraine’s membership in the EU, signalled to the Kremlin that Western-backed ‘regimes’ were coming into power in Russia’s sphere of influence. Fearing similar revolutions in Russia, Russia began invading Georgia in 2008 and annexed Crimea from Ukraine.

But if Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, why invade again in 2022?

Crimea was a strategic gain, but it didn’t halt Ukraine’s Western pivot. By 2022, Ukraine’s military was stronger, NATO ties deepened, and public opinion was firmly pro-European. For the Kremlin, this looked like a narrowing window to act.

In the end, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is more complex than attributing it to just NATO’s eastward expansion. It was a combination of countries wanting to join NATO for protection against Russia and US officials seeing an opportunity to ensure peace in Europe.

From using loopholes in German unification to ensure a reunified Germany remains in NATO to a shift in US policy under Clinton from phased expansion to immediate expansion to protect countries from potential Russian aggression.

On the Russian side, westernisation of countries led to the Kremlin fearing similar revolutions in Russia. Russia also placed trust in a pan-European alliance to replace NATO- one that ignored Central and Eastern Europe’s security concerns.

Blaming either the US and its allies or Russia alone oversimplifies the complex foreign policy dynamics from 1989 to the present.

In the end, mutual misunderstanding of a post-Cold War order drove both sides to pursue aggressive approaches to reshape Europe. Their consequences are still unfolding today.

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