News Editor Matthew Pellow speaks to Sam Dunning, Director of UK-China Transparency (UKCT), to discuss the burgeoning influence of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in British academia.
UK-China Transparency is a registered charity, aiming to provide more and better information on the links between the UK and China.
In light of UKCT’s report on the Lau China Institute at King’s College London (KCL), in this conversation, we explore the complex relationship between British universities and entities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This discussion highlights the influence of the CCP within British academia resulting in potential compromises to academic freedom and stressing the need for transparency.
“There is not enough research in the UK about the UK’s relationship with China, and in particular, about some of the more covert things that the Chinese state does in the UK.”
Sam Dunning
Origins of UK-China Transparency
Surprisingly, Dunning’s interest in the PRC’s influence in academia did not originate immediately at university. After graduating from Jesus College, Cambridge, he worked at “A company a bit like TED Talks.” He soon wanted a change.
“I was a bit sick of it”, he admitted, “I wanted to do some journalism and so in my spare time, I started researching my alma mater and their relationship with China.”
Dunning linked this developing interest in China with the COVID-19 pandemic and the renewed media hype around China’s world influence at the time.
“By the point I was writing articles, it was the middle of 2020, and suddenly this thing has come out of China and everyone’s thinking, ‘are we not […] paying enough attention to this country?’ Inadvertently, the world had changed because of something that emerged from China. And I sort of made the decision to learn Mandarin and start working on researching stuff to do with China.”
As he researched and wrote freelance investigative pieces, Dunning uncovered the true extent of PRC influence in British academia. “There was a charity, actually, that was, believe it or not, training CCP officials in the UK. Whether it was really training so much as networking, I think, is a moot point.”
Dunning contacted two other alumni of Jesus College, one of whom had already researched an individual who donated a million pounds to the College. In the following months, the donor had fled China, having been put on the Interpol red list.
Dunning notes that this “Doesn’t necessarily mean he was some big gangster.” He continued, “There’s a debate about the extent to which Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption purge is political, versus a genuine anti-corruption purge.”
“Whatever the case is, by the time Martin, my fellow trustee with whom I set up UKCT, was looking into it, this donor was also in trouble with the American authorities and he’s since been convicted of visa fraud. And so he was interested in that and I was interested in other stuff at the college, all to do with China, and we met.”
“Shortly after meeting these two other guys, Professor Sir Bernard Walter Silverman and Martin Village, suggested we set up an institution to basically try and expand and have a base for this kind of research. None of us really had anything to do with China before.”
Since their launch project on the legality of Confucius Institutes, UKCT has published more than five reports on Chinese state influence in the UK. You can read more of UKCT’s work at ukctransparency.org.
Questions Around the Lau China Institute
We discussed UKCT’s recent report on the Lau China Institute at KCL. The centre raised concerns about the potential influence of a single donor linked to the CCP who provided 99.9% of the Institute’s funding.
The report highlighted that the donor — Dr Ming-Wai Lau, a Hong Kong-based business tycoon, played a senior role in initiatives aiming to foster connections between Hong Kong’s youth and Chinese companies. One initiative involved a collaboration with the CCP’s United Front Work Department, an organisation said by MI5 to be linked with interference in UK academia and politics.
“As a general comment”, Dunning noted, “it’s not that easy to be very rich in Hong Kong and not have some kind of connection to the CCP.”
“We conducted a study of his, quote-unquote, ‘connection to the CCP’. And it’s not minor stuff.”
Dunning emphasised, “The key thing is that KCL refuses to say what the contents of their agreement with this donor are.” He pointed to the importance of asking questions in such cases: “How exactly is the collaboration structured? What’s the agreement? Who gets what?”
Dr Lau stated in the South China Morning Post that he saw the donation as “a way of supporting Hong Kong and China’s next generation of academics, leaders and entrepreneurs.”
Dunning argued, “He’s clearly got some idea of what he wanted the centre to do, the institute to do, whether it’s done that and what it’s done is another question.” He conceded, “A lot of its output must be brilliant [..] but the point is KCL’s agreement with the donor should be public because there are well-founded concerns that he exerted some influence over its framing, its governance and its goals.”
Some of UKCT’s freedom of information requests, including those on Dr Lau’s donation terms, were denied. According to KCL, these exemptions were applied in line with Information Commissioner’s Office guidance and “previous decisions which were cited in the response to the applicant [UKCT]”.
UKCT has stated its intention to take King’s to a tribunal.
“It’s important to state, I don’t know what’s in the agreement”, Dunning affirmed. “But the kinds of things that might be in there, that could have subtle systemic effects on the Institute, could shape activity and output of a research centre.”
“I’m speculating here, but suppose he wanted the institute to have a degree of exchange with China and the Chinese government.” Dunning reasoned, “This could be very positive. How do you learn about China and study China without exchange with, say, Chinese universities?” He notes, however, that it “should be up to the academics who run [these] institutes”.
Dunning reasoned that there may be circumstances in which it might not be appropriate to continue exchange with entities associated with the Chinese government. For example, Dr Jo Smith Finley from Newcastle University was sanctioned by the Chinese government because of her research into the ethnic cleansing of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang province.
Dunning argued, “Suppose, because of their research, an academic faces basically the ire of the CCP. What does that mean for a China centre that has to do exchange [perhaps as a result of a funding agreement] with the Chinese government?”
“Let’s be rational here and informed about the CCP, about the donor and about the terms, although they might seem innocuous, which could have an impact.” He continued, “It’s perfectly plausible.”
“I’m speculating that the donor might have said, ‘I want these terms, I expect this and that and I’m giving my money instalments’.” Dunning clarifies, “By the way, that’s a matter of fact. His money did come in instalments. It continues to come [as] instalments, and that there might be a sense that future instalments are dependent upon something.”
The Climate of Fear Among Chinese Students
One of the most troubling aspects of the PRC’s influence in UK academia is the fear and intimidation experienced by Chinese students who criticise the CCP. These students risk severe repercussions if they speak out against their government.
“Chinese students cannot say what they want, necessarily. I mean, they may not want to say things that are critical to CCP”, Dunning reflected, “But those who do cannot, or often feel they cannot, because they will face consequences. Serious, serious consequences.”
Dunning noted that many home students in the UK are completely unaware of this “parallel world” inhabited by dissident Chinese students.
“If they decide I’m going to start criticising Xi Jinping, I’ve had enough of what’s happening in my home country, I’m going to make a point of becoming political and saying things on WeChat – whatever.” Dunning explained, “They are essentially choosing to utterly change their life because they will be surveilled [and] they will be identified. And if they go back to China, they’re going to face serious consequences. If they really persist, once they’re arrested, in sticking to the kinds of criticisms that are lawful in the UK […] then they’re going to end up in jail. That is if they return to China [at all].”
“I don’t know if I can think of much worse, you know, in terms of what students can face in the UK”, Dunning emphasised. “Not being able to ever return to your homeland, never seeing or communicating with your family again, having to apply for refugee status, in some cases being nearly penniless as a result of all this, this is really serious stuff […] there’s a whole range of issues in the sector.”
Most crucially, Dunning observed, “Genuinely, [Chinese students] don’t really have any protections for their free speech.”
Dunning said, “I think there needs to be a much broader awareness of the severity of the consequences, that we’re not talking about a tiny minority. Even if it were, it would still matter. But we’re talking about 150,000 students from China in the UK.”
Dunning also brought attention to the serious issues faced by China studies academics in the UK. He cited the example of Professor Steve Tsang, one of the UK’s foremost experts in China studies. Tsang claimed that during President Xi Jinping’s visit to the UK in 2015, Nottingham University management requested that he refrain from speaking to the media, fearing his remarks might embarrass the institution, which operates a campus in China.
A Failure of Government or a Failure of Universities?
Dunning reflected on the importance of looking at how we have enabled CCP influence in the UK, as well as how the CCP has engineered it. There are, nevertheless, positives in the relationships between British universities and their PRC counterparts.
However, Dunning observes that the government from roughly a decade ago, especially around 2015 when Xi Jinping visited the UK and in the subsequent years, “really enabled and encouraged” some of the more covert forms of engagement by the PRC, namely with David Cameron’s promotion of contracts with Huawei.
“And you will find no shortage of critics of the David Cameron-George Osborne approach to China, although there’s obviously lots of debate about that.”
Dunning argues that the government bears some responsibility and continues to enable the CCP, noting that “the current government continues to not know quite what to do about some of these issues.”
DataHE estimated that around 25% of total tuition fee income to Russell Group universities came from China in 2023, risking overexposure and dependence.
Dunning linked a reliance on PRC funding and the deeper funding issues in British universities, partly caused by British universities’ over-dependence on Chinese student fees which could affect executive decision-making.
Dunning continued, “You can see how that creates certain incentives [to discourage criticism of the PRC at university] which can weigh upon decision-makers’ minds when they are making governance decisions about things that really should not be influenced by that kind of factor.”
In this way, he argues, universities share some of that culpability for allowing CCP influence in British higher education. In many ways, university executives have failed to think “about how they can support the rights and freedoms and safety of many of their Chinese members.”
“Most of the cases where people face consequences for things they’ve said or done, they’re not going to go and publicise it,” he noted, “They are essentially cowed into thinking, ‘Do I really want to make this choice in my life?’ Sometimes universities ask, ‘Well, where’s the evidence for all these students who are terrified?’ I think that’s sinister because there is evidence.”
“We published the account of a student at a London university who’s being harassed by the Chinese authorities. There is evidence. The reason it’s not superabundant here [with] dozens and dozens of cases every year is because people on the whole are too afraid to do these things. And even if they do these things [it’s a whole other challenge] to stick with doing those things once they face some kind of consequence.”
“It’s a complicity with an authoritarian system of oppression that has replicated itself here, enabled by globalisation and digital technologies,” Dunning underscored. “It is complicity. And universities have been complicit and they remain complicit.”
Conclusion
As we conclude our conversation, Dunning’s message is clear: CCP influence in British academia is real, and universities must prioritise transparency and the protection of academic freedom. The question now is not whether this influence exists, but rather how it can be eliminated. The stakes—academic freedom, ethical governance and the rights of Chinese students—could not be higher.
A spokesperson from KCL told Roar:
“In line with our duty to uphold and protect academic freedom, and as set out in our robust ethical review and gift acceptance policies, all King’s Global Institutes operate completely independently from donors, who have no influence over the focus of any research undertaken by the institutes. We are proud of the work of our Global Institutes in bringing together leading academics to critically examine and deliver country-focused research and expertise, that helps shape and inform global understanding.”
