Staff Writer Albert Horne provides a meaningful analysis of the role of special advisors in British politics. By looking back at their history, Horne argues powerfully for the need to ensure that powers of special advisors be used with caution.
What are Special Advisors?
Over the last 70 years of British politics, sleaze, scandal and lies have continuously dominated the media and the minds of British voters. However, in recent years, this has become impossible to ignore. Indeed, it has reached the point where British politics no longer feels serious or even inherently democratic.
For example, how can we vote for policies that we are not even guaranteed to see enacted? Similarly, how could we vote on a referendum that even our politicians seemed baffled by? From Brexit to Partygate, the important issues in UK politics appear to be swallowed up by the divisive ones.
It is easy to point fingers at individuals. Johnsons’ parties, Truss’ budget or even Blair’s invasion of Iraq. These decisions and events eroded public confidence in the transparency and efficiency of the government, leading the British public to take these instances personally. However, while there is some merit in individual blame, and these figures should not be let off the hook for the injustices they presided over, it would be naive to suggest that individual folly is the only problem facing our politics.
The frequency of these events in recent times points towards something else; a deeper, structural change that has affected our politics for the worst.
Blame also must be placed on the shift in the style of government that has evolved in recent years. One area that has gained influence is the Special Advisors Scheme. This scheme has had a huge impact on the hierarchies of advice and the information which our elected MPs and leaders receive. Not to mention, the impact it has had on the role of the Civil Service in government.
The exact point at which SPADs (or special advisors) were created is much debated. Some believe that the role of a confidant, selected exclusively by the Secretaries of State, goes as far back as the 1950s. However, their introduction as a crucial mechanism of government, as we see them today, is attributed to Former Prime Minister Harold Wilson in 1964. Their role was to provide political advice on matters of ‘party-specific’ policy, or as Wilson coined it, ‘the guardian of the manifesto’.
The concern for Wilson was that, following an extended period of Conservative dominance, the civil service were too conservative to impartially implement his own party-policy. The SPADs would provide a useful buffer between a supposedly ‘impartial’ civil service and a government that planned on reforming much of what they had worked on for over a decade. They could give advice to MPs that could either build on or disagree with the Civil Service, ensuring that the policies promised in the manifesto were enacted.
The key thing to remember is that these advisors did not go through any public application process, such as the civil service, nor were they obliged to work in the interests of the country. They were selected personally by members of the government and consequently only answerable to them. At the time of their inception, there were no caps on the number of advisors which a government could have.
In some cases, advisors were even put in charge of members of the civil service. It is not difficult then to anticipate the problems which might emerge between advisors and the civil service.
The question is: if our political system is based on democratically elected political leaders, should their advisors and sources of information also be elected, or at the least rigorously impartial? The answer to this question is far from simple. However, in order to secure a safer form of democracy, devoid of threat from inside Number 10, it must be acknowledged and addressed.
The Detrimental Impact of SPADS on the Government
Whatever Wilson’s original intentions, there is no doubt that an increase in SPADs’ importance has led to their role becoming increasingly contentious. Thatcher was the first example of this. She essentially used them as a way of providing different views to the opinions of her own ministers. Although one might justifiably think this would have led to a more detailed analysis of policies, it in fact had a detrimental effect on her own government.
Not only did this lead to her closest advisor, Alan Walters, falling out with her Chancellor Nigel Lawson, but it marked a huge shift in power. The fact that Thatcher refused to remove Walters (leading to Lawson choosing to leave his post) proved that advisors were now as important to leaders as their own cabinet ministers. Hence, Lawson was ousted by an unelected, unknown and unaccountable advisor.
Blair’s government similarly marked a change in the importance of SPADS. Instead of pitting them against ministers, Blair used them to challenge the advice of the civil service. Essentially, this engendered a sofa-style government, by-passing the arduous process of consulting with the civil service. Despite being a faster and more convenient way of governing, it inevitably removes the checks and due process required when deciding on government policy. The impartial civil service, although laborious, is a rigorous and necessary way of avoiding mistakes and unattainable policy promises.
How has this shift in power become so dangerous?
The shift in power toward the use of SPADs during the recent Conservative government continued. At one point this resulted in a threat to British constitutional integrity. Theresa May’s attempts to deliver a ‘soft’ Brexit led her to select a cabinet that were 50/50 on the Brexit question. The result was that no one could agree on what type of Brexit they wanted to deliver and the government effectively stagnated.
To combat this, she relied heavily on her two advisors Fiona Hill and Nick Timothy, who were ‘feared’ by Whitehall. Their apparent animosity towards the civil service was worsened by accusations that Whitehall was trying to obstruct Brexit. This ‘clash’ between May’s two advisors and their reluctance to consult with the cabinet and Whitehall resulted in disaster.
May had no choice but to call a general election, hoping to gain a majority to pass their Brexit through the House. The issue was that May was so reliant on Hill and Timothy that it was them alone who oversaw the Conservative Manifesto. Cabinet ministers stated that they had not even seen the manifesto before its party launch and were told to act as though they knew what was going on.
Essentially, Tory party policy was decided upon by unelected advisors, who were not even members of the party. Her over reliance on just two advisors potentially resulted in narrow and poor advice, culminating in disaster in the election for May. Her own party abandoned her, and she was forced to step down.
While May’s government seemed to have broken with convention, it was nothing compared to the subsequent pairing of Boris Johnson and Dominic Cummings. It was obvious from the outset that Cummings was hell-bent on remoulding the shape of British politics. He clearly had his own political agenda that was not subject to public scrutiny or indeed any scrutiny.
Members of Johnson’s Cabinet, like Sajid Javid, claimed it felt ‘at best like having two Prime Ministers, at worst like having an unelected one’. Since the collapse of the Conservative Government, Cummings himself has openly admitted to plotting to remove Johnson as PM, just days after he delivered Brexit.
The question then is, how much of the power in Number 10 was actually held by an elected minister?
Johnson’s first piece of ‘convention busting’ came with his decision to force a prorogation of Parliament. He did not tell members of the Cabinet the truth about his plans and then failed to consult the Attorney General about the legality of the decision, only talking it through with his own team of advisors. Johnson and Cummings effectively caused a suspension of the democratic process to force through their own agenda – without the support of the elected government.
He went on to anger ministers further when they were forced to sack their own teams of special advisors, replacing them with ones chosen by Cummings. The intention was to give him control of all policy advice given to cabinet members and, as some have suggested, to have spies in every office in government. Cummings had seemingly risen in rank, above even that of the cabinet.
Now with his huge influence in Number 10 and around the cabinet table, Cummings looked to Whitehall. The press published ‘hit lists’, made up of members of the civil service whom the Government planned to replace. A previously advisory role, that took place ‘behind-closed-doors’, was now stripped bare. As opposed to Whitehall’s traditional role of giving ministers options from which they could choose, it was now them that took the blame.
Overall, four permanent secretaries were published on the ‘hit lists’. Within two years all of them had resigned or been dispatched. Cummings then was the most extreme example of how much power an unelected advisor could grab. He systematically undermined and subsequently outranked the cabinet, the civil service and arguably Johnson himself.
The issue with an advisor having so much power was that they had no political accountability. The Durham Scandal saw Cummings caught escaping to his countryside home during Covid, despite the government specifically telling the public to stay at home. The most notable aspect of this was not Cummings’ actions themselves – after all, Johnson’s term was already littered with rule-breaking – it was the Prime Minister’s reaction.
A cabinet minister would almost certainly have been dismissed for such a blatant disregard of the rules; however, Cummings was defended by Johnson. This was made worse by the infamous ‘Garden Interview’, where Cummings invited the press to Downing Street where he refused to apologise and spun a web of fanciful excuses. At this point it was clear that Johnson’s decision to keep him on was not Johnson’s fabled ‘loyalty’ but rather his reliance on Cummings.
It proved Cummings and his team had gone too far. He could not be held to account democratically for his decisions, but was now seemingly impervious to criticism from his boss. The democratic system had been entirely circumnavigated.
With Truss’ subsequent decision to sack numerous civil servants, this period of Conservative government from Theresa May to the end, continuously abused the British governmental system. Their disdain for Whitehall and over-reliance on advisors, who were in some cases more powerful than elected MPs, came close to undermining the democratic process.
Political figures such as Dominic Cummings can seriously undermine the democratic process if they are left unchecked by the elected Government. This period came very close to collapsing the governmental system and should be treated as a lesson.
The recent resignation of Sue Gray and the furore over her role within the Labour government illustrates the continuing controversy over special advisors in politics. Her role as head of the Ethics and Propriety committee gave her enormous value to Starmer and his team. However, the lines between Whitehall and advisors were once again blurred. Numerous complaints were made over the failure to declare her discussions about joining Starmer, that allegedly took place whilst she was a Civil Servant under the Tory government.
Then stories of her clashes with other senior officials like Morgan McSweeney begun to emerge. When it was finally reported that her pay exceeded that of the PM himself (£170,000), the pressure had grown too much. Her forced resignation exemplifies the public disapproval surrounding the power held by SPADs. It remains to be seen whether the new Labour government will continue with this trend, giving further powers to their own special advisors and continuing down the same dangerous path as their predecessors, or try to reverse it.
What should be done?
The urge for ministers to use SPADs in decision making is understandable, yet their influence has evolved into something dangerous. Their role is not explicit and can be misused both by advisors and politicians. This is not merely a threat to Whitehall but a threat to democracy itself.
What once was a simple advisory role has been abused by ministers. Whether that was to circumnavigate the Civil Service or even their own Cabinet, essential parts of the British governmental system have been close to collapse. Advisors themselves have also abused their positions, believing themselves to be above democratic scrutiny and higher in rank than the elected official they are supposed to be advising. There must then be some kind of shift in the hierarchy concerning special advisors. It is essential that ministers use them properly, without relying on them over and above Whitehall or their Ministers.
